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Abstract: 
We assess the relevance of formal education for the productivity of the self-employed and 
distinguish between opportunity entrepreneurs, who voluntarily pursue a business 
opportunity, and necessity entrepreneurs, who lack alternative employment options. We 
expect differences in the returns to education between these groups because of different levels 
of control. We use the German Socio-economic Panel and account for the endogeneity of 
education and non-random selection. The results indicate that the returns to a year of 
education for opportunity entrepreneurs are 3.5 percentage points higher than the paid 
employees’ rate of 8.1%, but 6.5 percentage points lower for necessity entrepreneurs. 
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1 Introduction 
While estimating the returns to education for wage workers is consistently of the most 
prominent topics in labour economics, only recently have researchers attempted to assess how 
the returns to education compare for entrepreneurs (see Van der Sluis et al., 2008, for a 
survey). The research frontier concerning entrepreneurs is now taking into account the 
econometric challenges known from the literature concerning paid employees, such as the 
endogeneity of education and self-selection. These studies estimate that the returns to 
education are higher for entrepreneurs than for employees in the United States (Van Praag et 
al., 2009) and potentially also in the Netherlands (Parker and Van Praag, 2006; although these 
authors do not offer a direct comparison between the groups). 
Entrepreneurs are a heterogeneous group, primarily because of large differences in their 
motivations to become entrepreneurs – you may think of the worlds between a street-food 
vendor and the creator of a high-tech start-up. Research in the economics of entrepreneurship 
distinguishes between opportunity entrepreneurs, who voluntarily engage in entrepreneurship 
to pursue a business opportunity they spotted, and necessity entrepreneurs, who are pushed 
into entrepreneurship because they lack employment alternatives (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2002; 
Sternberg et al., 2006; Ardagna and Lusardi, 2009; Block and Wagner, 2010). Figure 1 
depicts the share of entrepreneurial activity that is necessity-driven in Germany and the US 
based on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Research Association (2012) and clearly 
indicates that this phenomenon deserves attention. Strikingly, in the US necessity 
entrepreneurship temporarily tripled between 2008 and 2010, presumably because of the large 
number of people who lost their jobs during the financial and economic crisis.4 This paper is 
the first to extend the emerging literature about entrepreneurs’ returns to education, which 
                                                 
4 In a New York Times article, former US Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (2010) refers to the seemingly 
paradoxical phenomenon of an increasing number of start-ups in the midst of the crisis and concludes that 
“millions of Americans had no choice but to try selling themselves”. 
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treats the entrepreneurs as a homogenous group, by investigating the heterogeneity in these 
returns between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs and comparing them to those of paid 
employees. 
Figure 1: Relative prevalence of necessity-driven entrepreneurial activity (in %) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Research Association (2012). Data 
collection started in 2001. 
 
There is increasing evidence that the social benefits of entrepreneurship as a whole are 
greater than the private benefits, mainly because of its function in innovation and job creation 
(Van Praag and Versloot, 2007).5 Because of these presumed positive external effects, policy 
makers are interested in promoting entrepreneurship. This analysis focuses on education, 
which is known to be a central factor for productivity in modern economies. If formal 
education increases entrepreneurial returns relative to an employee’s returns, education policy 
may be a suitable instrument to stimulate entrepreneurship. 
To derive policy implications from estimates of entrepreneurial returns to education, one 
has to differentiate between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. Opportunity 
entrepreneurs are considerably more likely to generate positive external effects through 
                                                 
5 Analysing an endogenous growth model, Michelacci (2002) provides theoretical reasons for encouraging 














innovation than necessity entrepreneurs, who usually engage in conventional and established 
activities. Since the extant literature only estimates the returns to education averaged over 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, it is not possible to infer if more education will make 
opportunity entrepreneurship more attractive than regular employment, which would likely 
increase its incidence. For opportunity entrepreneurs, potential income as a paid employee 
reflects the opportunity cost, whereas for necessity entrepreneurs, the alternative option of 
paid employment is at least temporarily unavailable. Therefore, for opportunity entrepreneurs, 
the difference in the returns to education between opportunity entrepreneurs and paid 
employees is decisive, while for necessity entrepreneurs, the relevant question is if formal 
education increases their productivity at all. 
Public policy concerning entrepreneurship has implicitly distinguished between 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs in many cases. The German government, for 
example, offers public start-up subsidies for unemployed people, which effectively targets 
potential necessity entrepreneurs.6 The goal of the programme is to make participants 
independent of unemployment benefits. It is relevant to know if the programme allows 
participating nascent entrepreneurs to use their formal (and publicly subsidised) education 
productively. Germany is an interesting case not only because of these start-up subsidies, but 
also because there is concern that entrepreneurial activity in Germany is rather low in 
international comparison.7 
This paper also speaks to the stream of literature in labour economics that attempts to test 
the signalling and screening theory of education by arguing that this theory implies lower 
returns to education for the self-employed than for paid employees (e.g. Wolpin, 1977; Brown 
and Sessions, 1999; Heywood and Wei, 2004; see Chevalier et al., 2004, for a critical 
                                                 
6 Caliendo and Künn (2011) provide an evaluation of this programme. 
7 Based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Kelley et al. (2011) report that the rate of early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity (the percentage of adults in each economy that are in the process of starting businesses or 
operating new businesses up to 3.5 years old) is 5.6% in Germany as compared to an average of 6.9% in the 
countries classified as innovation-driven economies as well. For instance, the respective rates are 5.7% in 
France, 7.3% in the UK and 12.3% in the US. 
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discussion). Since the self-employed are their own bosses and no information problem occurs, 
they exclusively use the productivity enhancing function of education, i.e. the human capital 
they have built up, this literature argues. Employees, in contrast, are remunerated both for 
their human capital and the signalling value of education toward the employer. Employees’ 
additional returns to education are then attributed to the signalling value and interpreted as 
evidence for the signalling theory. This paper assesses to what extent the practice of pooling 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs may shed doubt on this interpretation. If necessity 
entrepreneurs have lower returns to education than opportunity entrepreneurs and therefore 
decrease the average returns for the self-employed used in these studies, the lower returns 
cannot be attributed to the absence of the signalling function of education toward employers, 
because in this respect necessity entrepreneurs do not differ from opportunity entrepreneurs. 
In this study, we estimate the returns to education for opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs in comparison to paid employees using representative household panel data for 
Germany, the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP). We apply a random effects IV 
approach to account for the endogeneity of education and consider non-random selection 
based on unobservables into different employment states, i.e. regular employment, 
opportunity entrepreneurship, necessity entrepreneurship, and non-employment. Besides 
socio-demographic control variables, we control for the Big Five personality traits and locus 
of control, which are elicited using short inventories, as well as a measure of risk aversion. 
These traits and preferences have been shown to be important determinants of entrepreneurial 
choice and success (e.g. Evans and Leighton, 1989; Cramer et al., 2002; Zhao and Seibert, 
2006; Caliendo et al., 2009, 2010, 2011). 
The empirical results reveal that the impact of formal education on entrepreneurial 
productivity differs substantially between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. The 
estimates based on the full sample indicate that the return to a year of education for 
opportunity entrepreneurs is 3.5 percentage points higher than the benchmark return for 
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employees, which is estimated to be 8.1%. The returns for necessity entrepreneurs, in sharp 
contrast, are 6.5 percentage points lower and not significantly different from zero. The 
differences between opportunity entrepreneurs and necessity entrepreneurs are significant and 
robust to the various specification choices tested. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses to be tested from the 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and explains the econometric approach. Section 4 
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes the analysis. 
2 Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Returns to education in human capital and signalling theories 
Positive returns to education may be explained by human capital theory, as pioneered by 
Becker (1962) and Schultz (1963), which states that education increases productivity and, 
therefore, wages. Alternatively, signalling theory, as largely developed by Spence (1973), 
argues that instead of causally increasing a person’s productivity, formal education works as a 
signalling device to labour markets with imperfect information. According to this screening 
hypothesis, education helps potential employers identify suitable employees in terms of their 
abilities, stamina, motivation and the like. A higher educational degree signals higher inherent 
productivity and employers therefore offer higher wages to the more educated. 
The standard method for empirically quantifying the returns to additional schooling, 
which also provides the basis for this analysis, is to estimate an earnings equation, as 
developed by Mincer (1974). This estimation consists of a regression of the natural logarithm 
of wages on the schooling level and other factors influencing human capital, especially work 
experience. According to Hartog and Oosterbeek (2007), most studies report point estimates 
for employees of between 5% and 15% higher wages for an additional year of education. The 
main econometric challenges in this literature are the endogeneity of education, unobserved 
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heterogeneity and sample selection (e.g. Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Card, 1999; Harmon et al., 
2003; Shane, 2006). Dickson and Harmon (2011) and Henderson et al. (2011) point out that 
researchers focus too much on a single estimated rate of return for the population and neglect 
how returns to education might differ between sub-populations. We argue that this critique is 
even more relevant for entrepreneurs because of their apparent heterogeneity and that it is 
crucial to distinguish between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. 
An extensive literature attempts to assess the relative importance of the productivity 
enhancing (human capital) effect of education versus its information (signalling) function in 
explaining positive returns to education (see Riley, 2001, for a survey, and Chevalier et al., 
2004, for criticism of alleged evidence for the screening hypothesis and own estimations). 
One strategy frequently applied to test the screening hypothesis is to compare the returns to 
education of employees to those of the self-employed, as discussed next. 
2.2 Returns to education of employees and entrepreneurs 
One motivation to estimate the returns to education of the self-employed has been the idea of 
using the self-employed as a control group to test signalling theory (e.g. Wolpin, 1977; Brown 
and Sessions, 1999; Heywood and Wei, 2004).8 This literature argues that the self-employed 
are an unscreened group, as they do not need the informative function of education for an 
employer. The returns to education of employees, in contrast, represent the sum of the 
productivity and signalling effects. The difference between a higher rate of returns for 
employees and a lower rate for the self-employed is then interpreted as the signalling 
component of the returns. One caveat of this strategy recognised by Backes-Gellner and 
Werner (2007) and Parker and Van Praag (2006) is that entrepreneurs may also need formal 
                                                 
8 In this study as in many others, the self-employed are used as a measureable proxy of entrepreneurship. The 
concepts of self-employment and entrepreneurship are not necessarily the same, although they certainly overlap 
widely. Common definitions of entrepreneurship mention innovation and risk bearing, whereas the self-
employed bear income risk, but not necessarily innovate. The distinction between opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs is helpful, as opportunity entrepreneurs are closer to narrow definitions of entrepreneurship. 
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education as a signal, e.g. for clients, employees or capital lenders. Signalling theory therefore 
does not provide clear predictions about the relative returns to education of entrepreneurs and 
employees (cf. Van Praag et al., 2009). In this study, we will show that differences in the 
returns to education between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, which cannot be due to 
signalling toward employers, cast further doubt on the use of the self-employed as a control 
group to test the signalling theory. 
Other theoretical considerations predict that entrepreneurs should enjoy higher returns to 
education than paid employees. According to Douhan and Van Praag (2009) and Van Praag et 
al. (2009), entrepreneurs have more control in which ways to employ their human capital than 
employees, who face organisational constraints.9 Entrepreneurs have greater scope to align 
their business with their specific capabilities than paid employees, who have to fulfil assigned 
tasks, obey rules set by superiors, and stick to work descriptions that are not individually 
tailored to them. Entrepreneurs may therefore be in a better position to maximise the returns 
to their education. They also have more control over the accruals from their human capital, as 
they are the residual claimants of their firms and not tied to wage brackets. In this study, we 
render this personal control theory more precisely by noting that it should be more relevant 
for opportunity than for necessity entrepreneurs. The fact that necessity entrepreneurs, by 
definition, did not voluntarily intend to become entrepreneurs, clearly demonstrates that they 
do not have full control over the employment of their human capital, very much in contrast to 
opportunity entrepreneurs. 
In their literature review of the empirical evidence, Van der Sluis et al. (2008) summarise 
that studies using US data tend to report returns to education that are higher for entrepreneurs 
than for employees, whereas in Europe the opposite is found, although studies were only 
available for the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands. Van Praag et al. (2009), who take into 
                                                 
9 Benz and Frey (2008) also emphasise that entrepreneurs enjoy more autonomy and control and relate this to 
higher work satisfaction. 
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account the endogeneity of education (in contrast to the studies surveyed by Van der Sluis et 
al., 2008), confirm higher returns for entrepreneurs in the US. Parker and Van Praag (2006) 
estimate entrepreneurial returns in the Netherlands that exceed estimates for paid employees 
reported in Levin and Plug (1999), but they do not offer an own direct comparison.10 
Evidence for Germany is scarce and inconclusive. Williams (2003) reports point 
estimates of the returns to education for entrepreneurs between 2.5% using OLS regression up 
to 10.8% using an IV approach, but the effects are statistically not different from zero. Block 
et al. (2010) find returns of 10.5% based on a random effects IV model, without a direct 
comparison to paid employees. Block and Wagner (2010) focus on the characteristics and 
earnings differentials of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. Education is among various 
variables considered, but its endogeneity is not taken into account. The (potentially biased) 
estimates imply returns to education of only 4.3% for opportunity entrepreneurs and returns 
that are not statistically different from zero for necessity entrepreneurs. To reconcile the 
mixed results, this paper estimates the returns to education for opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs, directly tests for differences from the returns for employees, and accounts for 
the endogeneity of education and non-random self-selection. 
2.3 Necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs 
Before we derive hypotheses about the returns to education for opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs, these concepts need further clarification. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) distinguishes between entrepreneurs who i.) perceive a business opportunity and 
choose entrepreneurship as one of several career options, and ii.) who feel the necessity to 
engage in such activity due to the absence of other employment opportunities (Reynolds et al., 
2002). In contrast to the GEM data, the data we choose for this analysis, from the German 
                                                 
10 Co, Gang and Yun (2005) use data from Hungary and account for non-random selection; large standard errors 
do not allow drawing clear conclusions about differences in returns to education between entrepreneurs and 
employees. 
 9 
Socio-economic Panel, do not include information on a subjective self-classification into 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs (except in 2010, see Section 3.2), and we rely on 
objective information from the recent employment history to classify respondents (see Section 
3.1 for our reasons for this choice of data). 
We use registered unemployment before entering self-employment as a broad distinction 
criterion, as someone who registers as unemployed is, by definition, looking for employment. 
We therefore label those self-employed persons, who were registered unemployed before 
entering self-employment, as necessity entrepreneurs, and all others as opportunity 
entrepreneurs. This procedure allows us to classify all the self-employed in the sample and 
keep the analysis representative for the German population. By additionally controlling for 
individual cumulated prior unemployment experience in our regressions, we avoid that the 
indicator for necessity entrepreneurship picks up the potential depreciation effect of 
unemployment spells on human capital (Arulampalam, 2008). 
To assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to the operationalisation of 
opportunity versus necessity entrepreneurship, we repeat the estimations using a different, 
more specific approach. Here we closely follow Block and Wagner (2010) and inspect the 
circumstances under which a self-employed person left her previous job as a paid employee. 
Self-employed persons who voluntarily quit their previous jobs are labelled opportunity 
entrepreneurs, as it is straightforward to assume that they did so in order to enter 
entrepreneurship. Those who lost their last jobs involuntarily because of closure of the 
company or dismissal are classified as necessity entrepreneurs. While this classification may 
be seen as more precise, a disadvantage is that by construction only those entrepreneurs can 
be included in the sample who had a wage job before.11 In Section 3.2, we assess the validity 
                                                 
11 When we use this classification scheme, like Block and Wagner (2010), we only include those self-employed 
who lost their last wage job not more than two years before they enter self-employment; if the gap between the 
two employment spells is larger, one may doubt if the way the former job was ended is informative enough 
about the motivation to becoming an entrepreneur. Only the first self-employment spell is included in case of 
serial entrepreneurs, as for subsequent spells again it is harder to make a judgment on the motivation. We also 
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of the two alternative operationalisations of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs by 
exploiting direct questions for the motivations of becoming self-employed asked in 2010. 
2.4 Hypotheses for necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs 
We will derive hypotheses about the returns to education for opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs based on a novel extension of personal control theory (see Section 2.2), which 
originally only spoke about the difference between the total of entrepreneurs and paid 
employees (Douhan and Van Praag, 2009). Opportunity entrepreneurs are in the position to 
reap the fruits that the enhanced personal control over the employment of and the accruals 
from their human capital offers them as an entrepreneur. They have spotted a business 
opportunity that allows them the best use of their specific human capital (in the sense of 
Lazear, 2009; compare Becker, 1962, and Neal, 1995). Opportunity entrepreneurs can prepare 
for their step into entrepreneurship thoroughly beforehand – as they have alternative 
employment options, they can wait till the optimal time has come. If the choice to become an 
entrepreneur is economically rational, opportunity entrepreneurs will only make this choice if 
their returns exceed their opportunity costs, i.e. the wage they would earn in paid 
employment.12 Hence, they can use their former education investments more productively 
than in alternative paid employment. 
In contrast, necessity entrepreneurs would not be entrepreneurs if they had alternative 
employment options. The fact that they are pushed into their entrepreneurial activities 
demonstrates that they do not have full control over the use of their human capital. Therefore, 
they cannot fully exploit the benefits from personal control. As entrepreneurship is their 
remedy of last resort, it is likely that they do not have time to develop a business idea that best 
fits their skills, and they cannot wait for the optimal point in time. One can argue that the ex-
                                                                                                                                                        
exclude those self-employed from the sample whose former wage job was terminated because a limited time 
contract expired, because in this case classification into opportunity or necessity entrepreneurs is unclear. 
12 Hvide (2009) provides a model of the interaction between the decision to become an entrepreneur and the 
employers’ efforts to keep their workers. 
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ante expected payoffs from necessity entrepreneurs’ investments in education do not 
actualise, as unexpectedly there is no demand for their formally acquired skills on the labour 
market; necessity entrepreneurs have to reorientate themselves. It is not wages from paid 
employment that constitute the opportunity costs for necessity entrepreneurs, as this 
alternative is not available, but rather the transfers they would receive in case of 
unemployment. Even if necessity entrepreneurship does not use the human capital acquired at 
all (which is a sunk investment in this situation), it may be more attractive than (long-term) 
unemployment, which also does not provide returns to human capital. In summary, we can 
derive three hypotheses to be tested, ceteris paribus: 
Hypothesis 1: Opportunity entrepreneurs have higher returns to education than necessity 
entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 2: Opportunity entrepreneurs have higher returns to education than paid 
employees. 
Hypothesis 3: Necessity entrepreneurs have lower returns to education than paid 
employees. 
3 Econometric approach and data 
3.1 Representative household panel data 
In this analysis we use the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), a yearly household panel 
survey that is representative for the population in Germany.13 In 2010 about 23,000 
individuals living in more than 10,000 households were successfully interviewed. For our 
purpose, we prefer the SOEP to other data sources such as the Global Entrepreneurship 
                                                 
13 The central aim of the SOEP is to collect representative micro-data about individuals and households. It is 
similar to the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) in the USA and the BHPS (British Household Panel 
Survey) in the UK. A stable set of core questions appears every year, covering population and demography; 
education, training, and qualification; labour market and occupational dynamics; earnings, income, and social 
security; housing; health; household production; and basic orientation. For a more detailed data description, see 
Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007). 
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Monitor, because, as a general household panel, the SOEP has the advantage of offering 
detailed socio-economic information, in particular with respect to employment, education and 
income; these data have been used and tested for plausibility in labour economics and other 
fields extensively. Moreover, the SOEP provides a rich set of control variables unavailable in 
other data bases, including scores from short psychological inventories of personality traits. 
We use unbalanced data consisting of the waves from 1998 to 2010, which allows us to 
cover several business cycles. The earnings regressions include persons who report earnings 
from work in employment or self-employment in their working age between 19 and 65 years 
of age;14 the first stage selection regressions additionally include the unemployed and those 
not participating in the labour market. We exclude from the sample observations of persons 
who are currently in education or vocational training, in military or community service, 
pensioners, farmers, and civil servants; as these persons are not usually confronted with the 
choice to become an employee or an entrepreneur while they are in these states, and their 
incomes are only determined by the market to a limited extent. Family members who help in a 
family business are also removed from the sample, since they are not entrepreneurs in the 
sense that they are running their own business. People are classified as entrepreneurs if they 
report self-employment as their primary occupational activity (see footnote 8). Education as 
the key variable in the Mincer type equation is measured as years of education, which assigns 
a standardised number of years depending on the highest degree a person attained.15 
Personality characteristics are shown to influence wages (Heineck and Anger, 2010) as 
well as entrepreneurial entry and success (Caliendo et al., 2011); at the same time, they may 
also be correlated with education. Thus, it is important to control for personality traits in both 
the selection and earnings equations. Personality scores may serve as proxies for unobserved 
                                                 
14 In the alternative estimation, with a more specific definition of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, not all 
the self-employed can be included in the sample (see Section 2.3). 
15 A university graduate, for example, is always assigned 18 years of schooling, no matter if it actually took 17, 
18, or 19 (or more) years to graduate. 
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ability and reduce the potential omitted variable bias in the coefficient of education (cf. 
Almlund et al., 2011), although we also deal with this issue using an IV approach (see below). 
Specifically, in 2005 and 2009, the SOEP included short inventories of the Big Five 
personality factors: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
(Costa and McCrae, 1992). In 2005 and 2010, a further inventory measured locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966).16 Several survey waves (2004, 06, 08, 09, 10) include a question about the 
general willingness to take risks.17 Dohmen et al. (2011) demonstrate in a field experiment 
with real money at stake that the answers to this survey question are good predictors for actual 
risk-taking behaviour. 
To control for human capital acquired in addition to formal schooling and human capital 
depreciation, we include prior labour market and unemployment experience, measured in 
years, in the regressions.18 We further account for age and dummy variables indicating 
gender, persons with children younger than 16 years in the household, those living with a 
partner (married or unmarried), with a migration background, with disabilities, and those 
living in western Germany. 
3.2 Characteristics of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for paid employees and opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs based on the full estimation sample (variable descriptions appear in Table A 1 
in the Appendix). Opportunity entrepreneurs exhibit the highest and necessity entrepreneurs 
the lowest mean hourly gross earnings; the t-tests to the right reveal that these differences are 
                                                 
16 In the inventories, the respondents were asked how much they agreed with different statements about 
themselves (on 7-point Likert scales). Fifteen items assessed the Big Five personality traits (3 items for each 
trait), plus internal and external locus of control were measured by 10 items. 
17 In survey waves where no information is available, we impute scores of the same respondents from the past, 
where possible, or otherwise from later interviews. This assumes that personality traits are stable for adults at 
least for some years, which is supported by the evidence (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2011, 2012). 
18 Prior experience excludes the current year to avoid endogeneity. A squared term of work experience is also 
included. 
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statistically significant.19 The variance of hourly earnings is greater for both groups of 
entrepreneurs than for employees, which reflects the greater risks associated with 
entrepreneurship. Necessity entrepreneurs, on average, have fewer years of education than 
opportunity entrepreneurs, but still more education than employees. This is consistent with the 
observation of Wagner (2005) and indicates that those unemployed who become 
entrepreneurs differ from the average unemployed, who have lower education than employees 
(cf. Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999). The share of women among the self-employed is only 
about 35% and does not differ significantly between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. 
Necessity entrepreneurs are more concentrated in eastern Germany, in comparison to 
opportunity entrepreneurs, because of the higher unemployment rate.20 Opportunity 
entrepreneurs more often had a self-employed father when they were 15 years old, and they 
have the most educated fathers. Among opportunity (necessity) entrepreneurs, 51% (24%) 
have at least one employee, and 36% (23%) are liberal professionals like self-employed 
physicians, lawyers, architects, journalists, and artists.21 Both types of entrepreneurs work 
about the same number of hours per week and significantly more than paid employees.22 
Concerning the personality traits, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs do not differ 
very much from one another; in comparison to employees, both exhibit the pattern described 
in Caliendo et al. (2011) with higher scores in openness to experience, extraversion, a more 
internal locus of control (this means they believe that their own actions determine their 
outcomes rather than luck or fate), and they are more willing to take risks. 
                                                 
19 Parker (1997) demonstrates that income inequality among the self-employed in the UK rose between 1976 and 
1991 because of increasing heterogeneity of the self-employed, which is consistent with a more important role of 
necessity entrepreneurs. 
20 This picture does not change when persons who were already self-employed in 1998 are excluded from the 
sample, which results in comparing only persons who became self-employed nine or more years after re-
unification in 1990. 
21 Some of the characteristics described here, such as the employment of workers, are not used as control 
variables in the regressions because they are presumably endogeneous; see Section 3.1 for the list of controls. 
22 Parker et al. (2005) note that the longer hours worked by self-employed persons may partly be explained by 
self-insurance against their higher income risk. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (full sample) 
 




t-tests of equal means 
 
OE vs E NE vs E OE vs NE 
 
Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. p-value p-value p-value 
grossEarnings 14.18 8.69 21.38 23.92 12.55 15.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
educ 12.50 2.55 13.87 2.93 13.37 2.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workExp 17.10 10.65 19.97 10.25 17.01 9.18 0.00 0.75 0.00 
unemplExp 0.27 1.09 0.10 0.55 0.94 1.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 
age 41.58 10.56 45.55 9.87 43.10 9.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
female 0.49 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.50 
west 0.74 0.44 0.80 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
partner 0.77 0.42 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.02 
children 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.14 0.96 
handicapped 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.45 
migrant 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.16 
openness 4.49 1.15 4.91 1.11 4.97 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.13 
conscientiousness 5.99 0.85 5.98 0.92 5.97 0.89 0.18 0.44 0.85 
extraversion 4.85 1.11 5.06 1.11 5.14 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 
agreeableness 5.40 0.95 5.36 0.96 5.38 0.99 0.00 0.70 0.43 
neuroticism 3.85 1.19 3.65 1.21 3.79 1.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 
internal locus 5.75 0.93 5.93 0.87 5.90 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.39 
external locus 3.62 0.91 3.33 0.91 3.58 0.99 0.00 0.21 0.00 
risk tolerance 4.68 2.15 5.54 2.18 5.68 2.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 
father selfempl 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
father’s educ 11.30 2.34 12.31 2.96 12.07 2.91 0.00 0.00 0.01 
mother’s educ 10.52 1.93 11.16 2.50 11.19 2.35 0.00 0.00 0.73 
childrenBelow6 0.19 0.48 0.21 0.51 0.21 0.49 0.00 0.18 0.99 
occTrainedFor 0.62 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.00 
employsWorkers   0.51 0.50 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
libProfessional   0.36 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
hoursWorked 37.85 12.34 44.45 17.48 44.36 16.98 0.00 0.00 0.89 





   
 
Notes: The three rightmost columns report p-values of two-sample t-tests with unequal variances. Definitions of the 
variables appear in Table A 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 1998-2010. 
 
Importantly, 66% of opportunity entrepreneurs report that they are working in the 
profession that they were trained for, but only 62% of the paid employees and only 57% of 
the necessity entrepreneurs make this claim; all these differences are significant.23 This 
finding supports the personal control theory extended in this paper (Section 2.4): Opportunity 
entrepreneurs can make better use of their specific human capital than paid employees, 
whereas some of the specific human capital of necessity entrepreneurs lies idle. Figure 2 
demonstrates that this gap between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs with respect to 
                                                 
23 The wording of the SOEP question is: “Is [your] position the same as the profession for which you were 
educated or trained?” with the response options “Yes”; “No”; “In training”; and “Has no job training”. We 
construct a dummy variable with 1 referring to “Yes” and 0 to “No” or “In training”; respondents without job 
training are excluded. 
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the share working in the profession trained for opens up at almost all levels of education.24 
Table A 2 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the alternative operationalisation of 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs (see Section 2.3), which provides a similar picture.25 
Figure 2: Share of entrepreneurs working in the profession trained for 
 
Note: The figure shows bivariate local mean regressions of the dummy variable indicating if an entrepreneur 
works in the profession she was trained for on the years of education, separately for opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 1998-2010. 
 
To further assess if our classifications capture the intended concepts of necessity and 
opportunity entrepreneurs, we evaluate novel special questions that are exclusively available 
in the 2010 SOEP questionnaire. These questions were posed to respondents who indicated 
                                                 
24 The difference between the two groups is always positive when it is significant; the insignificant cases where 
the gap is negative can easily be explained by sampling error. 
25 Using our baseline method of exploiting prior unemployment, we classify 14% of the self-employed as 
necessity entrepreneurs (Table 1), which is less than the share reported for Germany by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (Figure 1) based on self-classification. Obviously, our group of opportunity 
entrepreneurs includes some people that the GEM would classify as necessity entrepreneurs. Our second 
approach of inspecting the way an entrepreneur’s prior job was terminated is more specific with regard to 
opportunity entrepreneurs, but not all the self-employed can be classified using this approach. Here, even 36% of 
the self-employed that can be classified are labelled as necessity entrepreneurs (Table A 2 in the Appendix), 






7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Education, in years
95% Confidence Intervals
Opportunity entrepreneurs Necessity entrepreneurs
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that they had entered self-employment in the previous year and sought the reasons for their 
new self-employment. Table 2 shows the descriptive results. The columns labelled “general 
definition” refer to the baseline classification based on prior unemployment, and “specific 
definition” refers to the alternative classification based on the way the last job was terminated. 
For opportunity entrepreneurs, the wish to be their own boss is more important than for 
necessity entrepreneurs, while for necessity entrepreneurs, escaping unemployment and being 
unable to find employment are more important reasons for becoming self-employed. These 
differences are statistically significant when the general definition is used, as indicated by t-
tests; for the specific definition, the differences are all insignificant, presumably because of 
the smaller sample size, but the point estimates tell the same story.26 We conclude that our 
operationalisations capture the concepts of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs well.27 
Table 2: Reasons for becoming an entrepreneur 














 mean p-value Mean p-value 
Reasons for having entered self-employment on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies) 
I have always wanted to be my own boss. 5.12 3.94 0.09 5.50 4.77 0.40 
I did not want to be unemployed anymore. 2.24 5.33 0.00 2.60 3.31 0.55 
Others advised me to start up a business. 3.00 2.35 0.30 3.10 2.62 0.63 
I discovered a market gap. 2.52 2.72 0.74 2.70 2.85 0.87 
I wanted to earn more money. 4.06 3.61 0.56 5.00 4.46 0.64 
I did not find employment (anymore). 1.88 3.56 0.02 1.70 2.23 0.46 
I had an idea that I really wanted to implement. 3.33 3.28 0.94 3.30 3.23 0.95 
I was disadvantaged at my previous workplace. 2.63 2.50 0.85 3.10 2.23 0.39 
Additional questions: 1 (yes) or 0 (no) 
I actively searched before starting this job. 0.30 0.37 0.63 0.25 0.29 0.85 
I received start-up subsidies. 0.27 0.68 0.00 0.36 0.54 0.41 
Person-year obs. 486 99  103 74  
Notes: The SOEP questionnaire 2010 included some special questions that were directed at respondents who 
indicated that they became self-employed in the previous year. The general definition refers to the classification 
based on prior unemployment; the specific definition refers to the classification based on the way the last job 
was terminated. The columns headed “OE vs NE” include p-values of two-sample t-tests of equal means 
comparing opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs (with unequal variances). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 2010. 
 
                                                 
26 Necessity entrepreneurs are also more likely to receive start-up subsidies (note that these are not included in 
the gross earnings reported and therefore not used in the regressions), which is very plausible because most 
subsidies are only available for the unemployed. 
27 We cannot make use of these special questions to classify opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs in our 
regressions because the sample size would be too small if we used the year 2010 only. 
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3.3 Earnings equation and ability bias 
The basis for estimating the returns to education of paid employees, opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs is a Mincerian earnings function for person i in year t. Consider ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑜𝑝𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑒𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, wit gross hourly earnings, educit years of education, 
educit*x its interactions with x, oppEntreit and necEntreit dummy variables marking 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, Xit a vector of control variables (see Section 3.1), λit 
a selection correction term (see Section 3.4), dt year dummies, β and θ coefficients to be 
estimated, µi a time invariant random error component and εit a time varying error component 
(random effects model). The coefficient 𝛽1 measures the returns to education for employees 
(the reference group), the sum of 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 the returns for opportunity and 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 for 
necessity entrepreneurs. To facilitate comparisons with the extant literature, we additionally 
estimate eq. (1) including a general self-employment dummy and its interaction with 
education instead of distinguishing between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. 
For a consistent estimation of this equation, endogeneity of education and its interactions 
with oppEntre and necEntre must be taken into account, as unobserved ability may induce 
people to acquire more education and at the same time have a direct effect on earnings, as 
discussed extensively in the literature (e.g. Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Harmon et al., 2003). 
Some candidate instrumental variables (IV) used in the literature, which for example exploit 
compulsory schooling laws (Angrist and Kruger, 1991), are criticised because these 
instruments tend to be weak (Bound et al., 1995) or to identify a local treatment effect for a 
sub-group that is not representative (Card, 1999). Family background variables do not suffer 
from these problems, as they have strong predictive power for education that is not limited to 
a specific subgroup. A possible concern with these variables is that the family background 
may have a direct effect on earnings that does not work through education. Specifically 
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considering father’s education, Hoogerheide et al. (2012) investigate this potential issue using 
Bayesian analysis, based on the SOEP, the same data we employ. By experimenting with 
relaxations of the strict exclusion restriction, they show that the size of a bias introduced by a 
potential direct effect of father’s education on wages is typically smaller than the width of the 
95% posterior interval of the education coefficient of interest in the IV model, even if the 
strict exogeneity assumption were substantially violated. They conclude that using father’s 
education as an instrument in earnings regressions is a viable option, especially considering 
the problems with alternatives mentioned above. Therefore, we use father’s education and its 
interactions with oppEntre and necEntre as excluded instruments to account for the 
endogeneity of education and its interactions.28 Specifically, we employ the efficient G2SLS 
random effects IV estimator (Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar, 1987). 
3.4 Non-random selection 
Apart from the endogeneity of education, two potential mechanisms of non-random self-
selection may be at play. First, persons who are unemployed or who do not participate on the 
labour market do not report a wage and must be excluded from the earnings equation. We 
address this with a Heckman (1979) style two-step selection correction, which in the first step 
estimates binary participation equations separately for each year and in the second step 
introduces the combined predicted inverse Mills ratio λ as an additional regressor when 
estimating equation (1) by G2SLS.29 
                                                 
28 Father’s number of years in education is calculated based on his educational degree, analogously to the 
calculation of the respondent’s own education. We do not use mother’s education or other family background 
variables, as these variables have not been investigated as potential instruments in the way described, and as 
information on mother’s education is often missing in the data. 
29 For better identification, three variables are included in the selection equation, but not in eq. (1). The first two 
are the number of children in the household below the age of 6, which is the usual school entrance year in 
Germany, and its interaction with the female dummy, as these variables are strong predictors for parents’ work 
participation; in eq. (1), we control for the presence of children below 17. The third exclusion restriction is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the father was self-employed when the respondent was 15 years old, as this 
helps to predict participation, especially as an entrepreneur (cf. Taylor, 1996). Taylor (2001) reports that a self-
employed father increases the probability of becoming self-employed, but does not influence performance (see 
also Fairlie and Robb, 2007). We confirm that the three variables are jointly highly significant in the selection 
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Second, the non-random selection into self-employment, and more specifically, into 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs may potentially introduce bias.30 To assess if this is 
practically relevant in this application, we additionally estimate equations of the following 
type separately for the three employment states j∈{paid employee; necessity entrepreneur; 
opportunity entrepreneur}, controlling for non-random selection into each of these states: ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆𝑗𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡𝑗𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. (2) 
Education again is treated as endogenous, and we estimate G2SLS models as above. The first 
step selection equation now becomes a multinomial logit model that is used to estimate 
probabilities of belonging to one of the four groups j∈{not working; paid employee; necessity 
entrepreneur; opportunity entrepreneur}, with j=not working as the omitted category: 
P(𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑆 ) = G�𝛾𝑡𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑆 � = exp�𝛾𝑡𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑆�1+∑ exp4𝑘=2 �𝛾𝑡𝑘′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑆�,  (3) 
where the set of explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑆  includes Xit from above and the additional variables 
described in footnote 29. Again the multinomial logit models are estimated separately for 
each year, which allows calculating selection correction terms (Lee, 1983), 
𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗 = ϕ(Φ−1(G�𝛾𝑡𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡�)G�𝛾𝑡𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡� , (4) 
which are then combined over years and used as an additional regressor in eq. (2).31 
                                                                                                                                                        
equations. Furthermore, in the specifications that treat education as endogenous, we use father’s education in the 
selection equations instead of education; see Wooldridge (2002) for the econometric combination of selection 
correction and IV methods. 
30 Interestingly, Taylor (1999) reports that formal qualifications are no important determinants of the exit rate 
from entrepreneurship. 
31 Although the coefficients of the first stage selection equation are not of specific interest, we conduct 39 
Hausman (1978) tests (13 years times 3 categories) to test the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption 
underlying the multinomial logit model. The null hypothesis is rejected thrice at a 10% significance level, which 
is within expectations given the probability of a false rejection. In 15 cases, negative χ2 test statistics occur; this 
does not mean a rejection of the null, but may indicate that the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test are 
not met in these instances. 
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Results for the full representative sample 
In this section, we first examine the results when classification into opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs is based on prior unemployment (general definition), using the full 
representative sample; in the next section, we will consider the alternative, more specific 
classification, which considers the way the last job was terminated, using a sub-sample where 
these information are observed (see Section 2.3). Referring to the first classification approach, 
the first column of Table 3 shows the results from estimating the baseline earnings equation 
(1) employing the G2SLS random effects IV estimator. The point estimate for the return to 
education of employees, the reference group, is 8.1% for a year of education, which is in the 
expected range. The return of opportunity entrepreneurs is 3.5 percentage points higher (43% 
in relative terms) and the return of necessity entrepreneurs as much as 6.5 percentage points 
(80%) lower. The three coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and 
the returns of opportunity entrepreneurs are significantly higher than those of necessity 
entrepreneurs (p-value below 0.001). The data thus support all three hypotheses developed in 
Section 2.4. Furthermore, the returns to education of necessity entrepreneurs are not 
significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.308), indicating that necessity entrepreneurs are 
unable to use their formal education productively. 
The estimation shown in the second column does not distinguish between opportunity 
and necessity entrepreneurs, as in the prior literature. The returns to education of the self-
employed are on average 1.9 percentage points higher than those of employees (significant at 
the 5% level). This approach hides the statistically and economically important heterogeneity 
between the two types of entrepreneurs revealed in column 1. 
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Table 3: Joint earnings regressions with general definition of entrepreneurial types 
 RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE RE 




Full sample Full sample 
educ 0.0812*** 0.0825*** 0.0804*** 0.0806*** 0.0694*** 0.0698*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
educ x oppEntre 0.0349***  0.0302**  0.0042  
 (0.0081)  (0.0120)  (0.0069)  
educ x necEntre -0.0648***  -0.0664***  -0.0373**  
 (0.0157)  (0.0235)  (0.0154)  
oppEntre -0.5587***  -0.4964***  -0.1326  
 (0.1102)  (0.1535)  (0.1004)  
necEntre 0.6500***  0.6367**  0.2978  
 (0.2104)  (0.3000)  (0.2124)  
educ x selfempl  0.0186**  0.0127  -0.0023 
  (0.0075)  (0.0112)  (0.0067) 
selfempl  -0.3597***  -0.2896**  -0.0689 
  (0.1015)  (0.1430)  (0.0957) 
workExp 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 0.0421*** 0.0419*** 0.0393*** 0.0394*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
workExp squared -0.0059*** -0.0059*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
unemplExp -0.0733*** -0.0733*** -0.0712*** -0.0723*** -0.0793*** -0.0799*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
age -0.0077*** -0.0078*** -0.0077*** -0.0076*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
female -0.2043*** -0.2047*** -0.2036*** -0.2041*** -0.2056*** -0.2060*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
west 0.3111*** 0.3123*** 0.3143*** 0.3102*** 0.2903*** 0.2917*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0129) (0.0130) 
partner 0.0289*** 0.0292*** 0.0314*** 0.0306*** 0.0267*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
children 0.0113** 0.0107** 0.0102** 0.0094** 0.0103* 0.0101* 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
handicapped -0.0391*** -0.0385*** -0.0432*** -0.0407*** -0.0364*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
migrant 0.0168 0.0176 0.0159 0.0169 0.0126 0.0127 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0126) 
openness 0.0001 0.0002 0.0023 0.0022 0.0015 0.0016 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
conscientiousness 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0012 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
extraversion -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0043 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
agreeableness -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.0098*** -0.0091*** -0.0079** -0.0080** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
neuroticism -0.0159*** -0.0163*** -0.0165*** -0.0165*** -0.0138*** -0.0140*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
internal locus 0.0067** 0.0068** 0.0048 0.0051 0.0043 0.0045 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
external locus -0.0392*** -0.0389*** -0.0421*** -0.0405*** -0.0381*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
risk tolerance 0.0014 0.0011 0.0019 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
λ -0.0135 -0.0145 -0.0175 -0.0200 -0.0350* -0.0351* 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0200) (0.0201) 
Year dummies p-val.<0.001 p-val.<0.001 p-val.<0.001 p-val.<0.001 p-val.<0.001 p-val.<0.001 
Constant 1.0460*** 1.0321*** 1.0590*** 1.0602*** 1.1624*** 1.1584*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0484) (0.0506) (0.0365) (0.0366) 
R2 overall model 0.329 0.327 0.331 0.330 0.326 0.324 
continued on the following page 
 23 
Table 3 continued 
 RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE RE 




Full sample Full sample 
educ:       
  1st stage F stat. 2616.554 3927.501 2480.344 3658.618   
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.093 0.093 0.091 0.090   
1st interact. term:       
  1st stage F stat. 4144.514 6196.751 2923.589 4239.917   
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.139 0.139 0.106 0.103   
2nd interact. term:       
  1st stage F stat. 4308.837  2588.610    
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.142  0.093    
Person-year obs. 78371 78371 76010 76010 82364 82364 
Notes: Random effects G2SLS estimations (first four columns) with endogenous variables educ and its 
interactions with oppEntre and necEntre; excluded instruments: father’s education and its two interactions. F-
statistics at the bottom of the table refer to first stage tests of joint significance of the excluded instruments. λ is 
the selection correction term. In the row of the year dummies, the p-values refer to F-tests of joint significance. 
Definitions of the variables appear in Table A 1. */**/***: Significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 1998-2010. 
 
The first stage statistics indicate that the instruments are sufficiently relevant. For the 
endogenous variables (education and its interactions with the opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneur dummies or the self-employment dummy, respectively), the first stage F 
statistics of the excluded instruments and Shea’s Partial R2 are shown at the bottom of the 
table.32 The Hausman (1978) test rejects exogeneity of the variables treated as endogenous in 
the first column (p-value below 0.001). We therefore expect OLS or random effects 
estimators without IV to be inconsistent. For comparison, we nevertheless present the results 
from the usual random effects (RE) estimator in the two rightmost columns. The coefficient of 
the returns to education for employees is biased downward by more than one percentage 
point, as common in the literature on the returns to education; the reason may be attenuation 
bias due to measurement error in the education variable. The biased estimates do not show 
significantly higher returns for opportunity entrepreneurs than for paid employees; the returns 
for necessity entrepreneurs are still significantly lower than for employees, but the difference 
is smaller. The global estimate for the self-employed is not significantly different from the 
estimate for paid employees when endogeneity of education is not accounted for. 
                                                 
32 Full results for all first stage and selection equations are available from the authors on request. 
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We revisit the consistent estimates in the first two columns to briefly inspect the 
coefficients of the control variables and the selection term λit. The estimated coefficients of 
the control variables are consistent with expectations. Work experience increases earnings at 
diminishing rates, whereas unemployment experience decreases earnings; this is in line with 
human capital theory and human capital depreciation. Women and people living in eastern 
Germany have lower earnings. Interestingly, higher scores in agreeableness and neuroticism 
decrease and a more internal locus of control increases earnings.33 The coefficient of λit is 
insignificant, so there is no indication for selection based on unobservables, whereas in the 
random effects estimation without IV, λit. is significant at the 10%-level. 
In additional specifications, we assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to the 
exclusion of liberal professionals, i.e. mostly academic professions among the self-employed 
like physicians, lawyers, architects, journalists, and artists. Applying the consistent G2SLS 
estimator to the sample without liberal professionals, we obtain results that are very similar to 
the baseline estimation with regard to the returns to education of opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs (columns 3 and 4). However, the global estimate for the self-employed is no 
longer significantly different from the estimate for paid employees. As mentioned, some 
authors in labour economics report lower returns for the self-employed than for paid 
employees in other countries and attribute this to the absence of the signalling value of 
education for the self-employed; they often exclude liberal professionals from their samples, 
which may partly explain their low estimated returns (e.g. Wolpin, 1977). 
Table 4 presents the results from G2SLS estimations of equation (2) separately for paid 
employees, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, controlling for non-random selection into 
each of the three states. The results are consistent with the baseline joint estimation reported 
                                                 
33 The eight personality variables are standardized before estimation, so the coefficients conveniently express the 
percentage change in earnings if a personality score increases by one standard deviation. The results with respect 
to education remain very similar if the personality variables are excluded from the model (available from the 
authors on request). 
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in column 1 of Table 3. The return to education for paid employees is estimated at 8.1% 
again, opportunity entrepreneurs have a higher point estimate of 13.9% (both are 
significant),34 and necessity entrepreneurs have a much lower point estimate of 3.0%, which 
again is not significantly different from zero. The selection correction term λitj is significant at 
the 10%-level for necessity entrepreneurs, but not for paid employees and opportunity 
entrepreneurs. Self-selection into opportunity entrepreneurship based on unobservables 
therefore does not seem to be relevant for the estimation. While the significant coefficient of 
λit, necessity entrepreneur suggests that non-random selection into necessity entrepreneurship should 
not be ignored from a statistical standpoint, the point estimate for the returns to education are 
similar to those in Table 3 and thus provide no indication for an important selection bias. 
Constraining the coefficients of the control variables to be the same for the different groups as 
done in Table 3, but not in Table 4, also does not seem to influence the results with respect to 
education.  In sum, our preferred specification is equation (1) as shown in the first column of 
Table 3 for the ease of comparisons between the groups. 
                                                 
34 While the point estimate for opportunity entrepreneurs is higher here (13.9%) than in the baseline estimation 
(8.1% + 3.5% = 11.6%), the estimates are not statistically different from each other considering the standard 
errors. 
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Table 4: Separate RE G2SLS earnings regressions with general definition of entrepreneurial 
types 
 Paid employees Opportunity entrepreneurs Necessity entrepreneurs 
educ 0.0809*** 0.1388*** 0.0297 
 (0.0044) (0.0357) (0.0613) 
workExp 0.0424*** 0.0396*** 0.0327 
 (0.0013) (0.0105) (0.0232) 
workExp squared -0.0061*** -0.0040*** -0.0005 
 (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0036) 
unemplExp -0.0775*** -0.0691** -0.0558 
 (0.0027) (0.0337) (0.0356) 
age -0.0070*** -0.0122* -0.0193 
 (0.0010) (0.0074) (0.0187) 
female -0.2068*** -0.2241*** -0.2611** 
 (0.0078) (0.0542) (0.1023) 
west 0.2905*** 0.4170*** 0.5183*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0620) (0.1038) 
partner 0.0347*** -0.0307 -0.0091 
 (0.0049) (0.0387) (0.0814) 
children 0.0062 0.0402 0.1118 
 (0.0040) (0.0325) (0.0718) 
handicapped -0.0337*** -0.1302* 0.0955 
 (0.0083) (0.0767) (0.1503) 
migrant 0.0186* 0.0709 -0.0497 
 (0.0110) (0.0741) (0.1388) 
openness 0.0034 -0.0488** -0.0627 
 (0.0030) (0.0226) (0.0490) 
conscientiousness 0.0025 0.0197 -0.0630 
 (0.0028) (0.0187) (0.0400) 
extraversion -0.0067** 0.0401* -0.0141 
 (0.0029) (0.0216) (0.0442) 
agreeableness -0.0091*** -0.0380** 0.0887** 
 (0.0027) (0.0190) (0.0377) 
neuroticism -0.0117*** -0.0369* -0.0185 
 (0.0028) (0.0189) (0.0400) 
internal locus 0.0027 0.0418* 0.1141*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0245) (0.0418) 
external locus -0.0375*** -0.0549** 0.0242 
 (0.0034) (0.0213) (0.0426) 
risk tolerance -0.0002 0.0257 -0.0084 
 (0.0019) (0.0204) (0.0378) 
λ -0.0087 0.0056 -0.3152* 
 (0.0102) (0.1156) (0.1733) 
Year dummies p-value<0.001 p-value<0.001 p-value=0.097 
Constant 1.0527*** 0.0374 2.4203*** 
 (0.0476) (0.6122) (0.8222) 
R2 for overall model 0.371 0.179 0.187 
1st stage F stat. 7035.156 316.907 75.283 
Shea’s Partial R2 0.090 0.051 0.074 
Person-year obs. 71446 5950 975 
Notes: Random effects G2SLS estimations with endogenous variable educ; excluded instrument: father’s education. 
F-statistics at the bottom of the table refer to first stage tests of significance of the excluded instrument. λ is the 
selection correction term. In the row of the year dummies, the p-values refer to F-tests of joint significance. 
*/**/***: Significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 1998-2010. 
 
 27 
4.2 Results for the more specific definition of entrepreneurial types 
To assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to the operationalisation of opportunity and 
necessity entrepreneurs, we repeat the estimations using the alternative classification scheme, 
which exploits the way the previous wage job was terminated, based on the sub-sample where 
such information are available (see Section 2.3). The results from estimating equation (1) 
appear in Table 5. Column 1 shows the G2SLS random effects IV estimation results, column 
2 excludes liberal professionals from the sample, and column 3 provides the results from a RE 
estimation not accounting for the potential endogeneity of education (again including liberal 
professionals). The estimated returns to education for paid employees in column 1 are similar 
to those in column 1 of Table 3 using the baseline classification scheme. The returns to 
education of opportunity entrepreneurs are not significantly different from those of paid 
employees when using this alternative classification, however. The coefficient of the 
interaction term educ x oppEntre is estimated imprecisely, as indicated by its standard error 
which is larger than in Table 3, presumably because of the exclusion of self-employed persons 
who could not be classified using this scheme. Necessity entrepreneurs still have significantly 
lower returns to education than paid employees, albeit the discount is not as large as in Table 
3. In this specification, the Hausman test of endogeneity does not reject exogeneity of 
education and its interactions (p-value = 0.441).35 The random effects estimator in column 3 
is therefore expected to be consistent in this case and is then preferred because of its higher 
efficiency. Here, the point estimate of the gap in the returns to education between paid 
employees and necessity entrepreneurs is larger.36 The returns to education are significantly 
smaller for necessity than for opportunity entrepreneurs based on the RE estimator (p-value = 
0.048), and also in column 2 where liberal professionals are excluded (p-value = 0.072). 
                                                 
35 The first stage statistics provided at the bottom of the table again indicate that the instruments are sufficiently 
relevant. The selection correction terms are statistically significant in all columns. 
36 The returns to education of necessity entrepreneurs are significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.048). 
When liberal professionals are excluded (column 2), the returns of necessity entrepreneurs are not significantly 
different from zero. 
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Table 5: Joint earnings regressions with specific definition of entrepreneurial types 
 RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE 
 Full sample No liberal professionals Full sample 
educ 0.0790*** 0.0787*** 0.0702*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0022) 
educ x oppEntre -0.0077 -0.0232 -0.0037 
 (0.0131) (0.0212) (0.0114) 
educ x necEntre -0.0372** -0.0830*** -0.0486** 
 (0.0167) (0.0260) (0.0201) 
oppEntre 0.0529 0.2151 0.0145 
 (0.1787) (0.2671) (0.1637) 
necEntre 0.3286 0.8770*** 0.4928* 
 (0.2238) (0.3336) (0.2717) 
workExp 0.0403*** 0.0401*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
workExp squared -0.0059*** -0.0058*** -0.0057*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
unemplExp -0.0722*** -0.0717*** -0.0768*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0054) 
age -0.0060*** -0.0059*** -0.0050*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
female -0.2027*** -0.2024*** -0.2009*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0085) 
west 0.2936*** 0.2936*** 0.2787*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0122) 
partner 0.0340*** 0.0346*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0066) 
children 0.0112*** 0.0096** 0.0114** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0054) 
handicapped -0.0299*** -0.0326*** -0.0287** 
 (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0115) 
migrant 0.0220* 0.0202* 0.0178 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0118) 
openness 0.0038 0.0039 0.0043 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) 
conscientiousness 0.0016 0.0010 0.0019 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0033) 
extraversion -0.0072** -0.0068** -0.0065* 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0034) 
agreeableness -0.0083*** -0.0079*** -0.0065** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0033) 
neuroticism -0.0109*** -0.0117*** -0.0099*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0032) 
internal locus 0.0034 0.0033 0.0016 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) 
external locus -0.0375*** -0.0379*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
risk tolerance -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
λ -0.0426*** -0.0416*** -0.0548*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0193) 
Year dummies p-value<0.001 p-value<0.001 p-value<0.001 
Constant 1.0524*** 1.0574*** 1.1524*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0358) 
R2 for overall model 0.357 0.360 0.352 
educ:    
  1st stage F stat. 2380.044 2327.725  
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.089 0.088  
continued on the following page 
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Table 5 continued 
 RE G2SLS RE G2SLS RE 
 Full sample No liberal professionals Full sample 
Interact. with oppEntre:    
  1st stage F stat. 4373.532 3080.595  
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.153 0.113  
Interact. with necEntre:    
  1st stage F stat. 4379.222 2514.679  
  Shea’s Partial R2 0.152 0.094  
Person-year obs. 73429 72796 77148 
Notes: Random effects G2SLS estimations (first two columns) with endogenous variables educ and its 
interactions with oppEntre and necEntre; excluded instruments: father’s education and its two interactions. 
F-statistics at the bottom of the table refer to first stage tests of joint significance of the excluded 
instruments. λ is the selection correction term. In the row of the year dummies, the p-values refer to F-tests 
of joint significance. */**/***: Significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv27, 1998-2010. 
 
As before, we also estimate equation (2) separately for paid employees, opportunity and 
necessity entrepreneurs, which enables us to control for non-random selection into each of 
these states. Table 6 shows that the point estimates of the returns to education in the three 
groups are similar to those in Table 4 using the baseline classification scheme, with a higher 
point estimate for opportunity entrepreneurs than for paid employees and a lower one for 
necessity entrepreneurs. Because of the lower number of self-employed observations after 
excluding those who could not be classified, however, the standard errors are large and the 
coefficients for the two types of entrepreneurs are no longer statistically significant. 
In summary, using the alternative operationalisation of the two entrepreneurial types, the 
evidence again supports hypotheses 1 and 3 (this is statistically significant in Table 5), 
whereas in this robustness check no conclusion can be drawn about the returns to education of 
opportunity entrepreneurs relative to paid employees (hypothesis 2) due to the lower precision 
of the relevant coefficients. 
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Table 6: Separate RE G2SLS earnings regressions with specific definition of entrepreneurial 
types 
 Paid employees Opportunity entrepreneurs Necessity entrepreneurs 
educ 0.0804*** 0.1152 0.0311 
 (0.0045) (0.0775) (0.0898) 
workExp 0.0417*** 0.0387 0.0403 
 (0.0013) (0.0320) (0.0342) 
workExp squared -0.0060*** -0.0051 -0.0046 
 (0.0002) (0.0032) (0.0042) 
unemplExp -0.0767*** -0.0621 -0.0435 
 (0.0027) (0.0610) (0.0433) 
age -0.0066*** -0.0109 -0.0145 
 (0.0010) (0.0279) (0.0306) 
female -0.2059*** -0.3511*** -0.2852** 
 (0.0078) (0.1168) (0.1292) 
west 0.2894*** 0.4013*** 0.4105*** 
 (0.0081) (0.1355) (0.1260) 
partner 0.0349*** -0.0260 0.0261 
 (0.0049) (0.0729) (0.1009) 
children 0.0073* 0.1104* 0.0940 
 (0.0040) (0.0581) (0.0886) 
handicapped -0.0327*** 0.1839 0.0750 
 (0.0083) (0.1702) (0.1691) 
migrant 0.0189* 0.2103 -0.0791 
 (0.0110) (0.1533) (0.1789) 
openness 0.0033 0.0051 -0.0151 
 (0.0030) (0.0459) (0.0593) 
conscientiousness 0.0022 0.0066 0.0118 
 (0.0028) (0.0421) (0.0507) 
extraversion -0.0067** 0.0137 0.0061 
 (0.0029) (0.0438) (0.0556) 
agreeableness -0.0090*** -0.0264 0.0332 
 (0.0027) (0.0421) (0.0484) 
neuroticism -0.0115*** 0.0259 -0.0121 
 (0.0028) (0.0425) (0.0492) 
internal locus 0.0026 0.0712 0.1027* 
 (0.0029) (0.0488) (0.0593) 
external locus -0.0371*** -0.0289 -0.0311 
 (0.0034) (0.0471) (0.0520) 
risk tolerance -0.0002 0.0393 -0.0499 
 (0.0019) (0.0354) (0.0422) 
λ -0.0203** -0.0372 -0.0311 
 (0.0103) (0.1442) (0.1939) 
Year dummies p-value<0.001 p-value<0.001 p-value=0.099 
Constant 1.0544*** 0.1973 1.4407 
 (0.0476) (0.7608) (0.9502) 
R2 for overall model 0.371 0.193 0.145 
1st stage F stat. 6949.640 68.304 40.782 
Shea’s Partial R2 0.089 0.052 0.057 
Person-year obs. 71446 1278 705 
Notes: Random effects G2SLS estimations with endogenous variable educ; excluded instrument: father’s education. 
F-statistics at the bottom of the table refer to first stage tests of significance of the excluded instrument. λ is the 
selection correction term. In the row of the year dummies, the p-values refer to F-tests of joint significance. 
*/**/***: Significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 




We estimate the returns to education for opportunity entrepreneurs, who voluntarily become 
entrepreneurs because they spot a business opportunity; for necessity entrepreneurs, who are 
pushed into entrepreneurship because they lack alternative employment options; and for paid 
employees, who provide a benchmark. We use representative household panel data for 
Germany, the SOEP, and account for the endogeneity of education and non-random selection 
into the different employment states. The results from the preferred specification indicate that 
the returns to an additional year of education are 3.5 percentage points higher for opportunity 
entrepreneurs than for paid employees, whose rate of return is estimated at 8.1%, and as much 
as 6.5 percentage points lower for necessity entrepreneurs. 
These results confirm our hypotheses, which we derive from our extension of the theory 
of personal control. According to the original theory (Douhan and Van Praag, 2009), 
entrepreneurs should enjoy higher returns to education than paid employees, because they 
have better control over the employment of and the accruals from their own human capital. 
We argue that this only applies to opportunity entrepreneurs, while the fact that necessity 
entrepreneurs cannot find employment at the labour market indicates that they have only 
limited control over the employment of their human capital. This is one of the reasons why it 
is crucial to distinguish between the two types of entrepreneurs when estimating 
entrepreneurial returns to education. 
When pooling opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs, as done in the prior literature, the 
single estimate of the returns to a year of education (we estimate an average 1.9 percentage 
points premium over paid employees in Germany) understates the value of formal education 
for those who become entrepreneurs because they spot a business opportunity. This paper 
shows that education policy can play a much more important role when governments intend to 
stimulate opportunity entrepreneurship than the prior literature suggested. At the same time, 
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the pooled estimate of returns to education averaged over the two entrepreneurial types may 
spark misguided hopes concerning necessity entrepreneurs, who may, for example, receive 
public start-up subsidies in the vainly expectation that becoming an entrepreneur will allow 
them to use their education productively. 
This analysis also provides a possible explanation for country differences in 
entrepreneurial returns to education. In their meta-analysis, Van der Sluis et al. (2008) 
speculate that higher entrepreneurial returns to education in the US in comparison to the 
European countries, where studies were available (the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands), could 
be due to different abilities of the educational systems to prepare the countries’ citizens for 
entrepreneurial activity (although the econometric shortcomings in the extant studies 
highlighted by Van der Sluis et al. constitute a limitation to this comparison). Combining this 
explanation with Lazear’s (2004) “jack-of-all-trades” view of entrepreneurs, this could imply 
that the educational system in the US is more successful in teaching the general skills 
entrepreneurs need to cope with their wide spectrum of responsibilities, while European 
education may tend to create specialists who do better as employees (see also Doms et al., 
2010). However, the large differences in the returns to education for opportunity versus 
necessity entrepreneurs found in this study suggest that different shares of necessity and 
opportunity entrepreneurs in a country’s total set of entrepreneurs may explain an important 
part of the country differences in the average returns to education of the self-employed. Brixy 
et al. (2011) demonstrate that the ratio between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs varies 
widely between countries. Figure 1 shows that necessity entrepreneurship was more prevalent 
in Germany than in the US before the financial and economic crisis, so average returns to 
education for entrepreneurs might have been lower in Germany even if the educational 
systems did not have different effects. These differences in the composition of entrepreneurs 
may have reasons unrelated to the quality of education; for instance, tighter labour market 
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regulation may push people into necessity entrepreneurship if this creates barriers to obtaining 
paid employment. 
Finally, the heterogeneity between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs casts further 
doubt on the use of the self-employed as a control group to test the signalling theory, because 
the lower returns to education of necessity entrepreneurs – which decrease the average rate of 
return for the self-employed – are not due to the absence of signalling toward employers (in 
this respect they do not differ from opportunity entrepreneurs), but due to their inability to use 
the productivity enhancing function of their education. We substantiate this explanation by 
demonstrating that a smaller share of necessity entrepreneurs report that they are working in 
the profession they were trained for than both paid employees and opportunity entrepreneurs. 
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Table A 1: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
oppEntre Dummy for a person who is classified as an opportunity entrepreneur. 
necEntre Dummy for a person who is classified as a necessity entrepreneur. 
selfempl Dummy for a self-employed person (sum of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs). 
grossEarnings Gross (before-tax) earnings per actual hours worked (in Euro). 
educ Number of years in formal education, generated based on educational degrees. 
workExpa Experience in full- and part-time work prior to the year of observation (in years). 
unemplExpa Accumulated duration of unemployment prior to the year of observation (in years). 
age Age of person (in years). 
female Dummy for females. 
west Dummy for a person living in western Germany (i.e. the old member states of former 
West Germany). 
partner Dummy for a person living with a partner (married or unmarried). 
children Dummy for a person with at least one child less than 17 years old in the household. 
handicapped Dummy for a physically or mentally challenged person. 
migrant Dummy for a person with a migration background. 
openness Openness to experience (scale 1-7). 
conscientiousness Conscientiousness (scale 1-7). 
extraversion Extraversion (scale 1-7). 
agreeableness Agreeableness (scale 1-7). 
neuroticism Neuroticism, i.e. the opposite of emotional stability (scale 1-7). 
internal locus Internal locus of control (scale 1-7). 
external locus External locus of control (scale 1-7). 
risk tolerance General willingness to take risks (scale 0-10). 
father selfempl Dummy for a person whose father was self-employed when the respondent was 15 years 
old. 
father’s educ Father's number of years in formal education, generated based on educational degrees. 
mother’s educ Mother's number of years in formal education. 
childrenBelow6 Number of children below 6 years of age in the household. 
occTrainedFor Dummy for a person who works in an occupation she was trained for. 
employsWorkers Dummy for a self-employed person who has at least one employee. 
libProfessional Dummy for a self-employed liberal professional (physicians, lawyers, architects, 
journalists, artists, etc.). 
hoursWorked Hours usually worked per week including overtime work. 
Year dummies Dummies for the years 1999-2010. 
Notes: Dummy variables equal 1 if condition holds and 0 otherwise. 










t-tests of equal means 
 
OE vs E NE vs E OE vs NE 
 
Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. p-value p-value p-value 
grossEarnings 18.83 14.17 15.06 18.57 0.00 0.21 0.00 
educ 13.70 2.98 13.44 2.81 0.00 0.00 0.06 
workExp 17.93 9.07 19.19 9.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
unemplExp 0.14 0.62 0.48 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
age 42.57 8.84 44.36 8.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
female 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.73 
west 0.82 0.38 0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
partner 0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.99 0.15 0.26 
children 0.44 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.34 0.00 
handicapped 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.18 
migrant 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.63 
openness 4.76 1.09 4.88 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 
conscientiousness 6.05 0.89 5.89 0.94 0.03 0.00 0.00 
extraversion 5.08 1.05 5.10 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.69 
agreeableness 5.30 0.96 5.34 0.97 0.00 0.12 0.45 
neuroticism 3.73 1.09 3.68 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.38 
internal locus 6.03 0.81 5.95 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.02 
external locus 3.33 0.90 3.64 0.95 0.00 0.54 0.00 
risk tolerance 5.76 2.15 5.54 2.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
father selfempl 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.69 0.00 
father’s educ 12.13 2.88 12.02 2.93 0.00 0.00 0.40 
mother’s educ 10.96 2.20 11.26 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.01 
childrenBelow6 0.23 0.51 0.18 0.47 0.00 0.66 0.02 
occTrainedFor 0.69 0.46 0.58 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
employsWorkers 0.50 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 
libProfessional 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 
hoursWorked 47.89 16.46 46.25 15.85 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Person-year obs. 1278  705     
Notes: The three rightmost columns report p-values of two-sample t-tests with unequal variances. 
Definitions of the variables appear in Table A 1. 
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